Sometimes There Is No Joy In "I Told You So"

A friend of mine sent me this press release from Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.), the ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee from September of 2002. 

It is haunting how clearly Congressman Skelton perceived the dangers of the Bush administration strategy for Iraq.

The text of Skelton's letter to the President follows:

September 4, 2002

 

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for inviting me to the briefing this morning. I share your concern about the continuing threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his efforts to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD). I would like to offer my assistance as the administration considers how to deal with this threat.

Before Congress can authorize any military action that might be part of the administration's plan, we must have answers to more questions than were able to be raised at today's meeting. Our constitutional duty requires us to ensure that all implications of such action are considered in advance. The case has not yet been fully made as to what the threat is, why military force is an appropriate way of addressing the threat, and why action must occur now. In short, Congress and the American people must be clear on your strategic vision before we can authorize a specific course of action. I believe, like Clausewitz, that in strategy there is an "imperative…not to take the first step without considering the last."

Your strategy for dealing with Iraq must address the fundamental questions of the threat, the method of acting, and the timing. Furthermore, any strategy to eliminate Iraqi WMD must also address several component issues, each of which raises critical questions.

1.   How to manage Iraq's transition to a stable post-Saddam regime

As I mentioned to you this morning, this is a crucial question for administration strategy to answer in advance of any military action. I have no doubt that our military would decisively defeat Iraq's forces and remove Saddam. But like the proverbial dog chasing the car down the road, we must consider what we would do after we caught it.

As Sun-Tzu said in the classic strategic treatise, The Art of War, "To win victory is easy; to preserve its fruits, difficult." Military planners and political leaders alike knew this in World War II. Planning for the occupation of Germany and Japan-two economically viable, technologically sophisticated nations-took place well in advance of the end of the war. The extreme difficulty of occupying Iraq with its history of autocratic rule, its balkanized ethnic tensions, and its isolated economic system argues both for careful consideration of the benefits and risks of undertaking military action and for detailed advanced occupation planning if such military action is approved.

Specifically, your strategy must consider the form of a replacement regime and take seriously the possibility that this regime might be rejected by the Iraqi people, leading to civil unrest and even anarchy. The effort must be to craft a stable regime that will be geopolitically preferable to Saddam and will incorporate the disparate interests of all groups within Iraq-Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurd. We must also plan now for what to do with members of the Baath party that continue to support Saddam and with the scientists and engineers who have expertise born of the Iraqi WMD program.

All these efforts require careful planning and long-term commitment of manpower and resources. The American people must be clear about the amount of money and the number of soldiers that will have to be devoted to this effort for many years to come.

2.   How to ensure the action in Iraq does not undermine international support for the broader war on terrorism

In planning for military operations in Iraq, we cannot ignore the lack of international support to date. Pre-emptive action against Iraq is currently vocally opposed by many of our allies and friends throughout the world and particularly in the Middle East.

When we are seen as acting against the concerns of large numbers of our friends, it calls into question the "humble" approach to international relations you espoused during the presidential campaign. More than that, it has several potentially damaging long-term consequences. First, it risks losing the large number of partners needed to prosecute the global war on terrorism. To ferret terrorist groups out of their many hiding places, we must have broad allied support. Second, it risks seriously damaging U.S. moral legitimacy, potentially providing states like India and Pakistan with a preemptive option that could drive long-standing conflicts beyond containable bounds.

Finally and perhaps most dangerously, actions without broad Arab support may inflame the sources of terrorism, causing unrest and anger throughout the Muslim world. This dynamic will be worse if Iraq attacks Israel-perhaps with weapons of mass destruction-and draws them into the conflict. Iran, which has the potential to seize a reformist path, may well move away from the United States in the face of attacks that could next be taken against them. Together, these dynamics will make achieving peace in the Middle East more difficult and may well provide the rationale for more terrorist attacks against Americans.

These concerns do not make military action in Iraq untenable. They do, however, highlight the depth and importance of the issues to be addressed before we strike. We need to ensure that in taking out Saddam, we don't win the battle and lose the war.

3.   How to ensure that the United States can execute this operation successfully as well as its other military missions

As you are well aware, Mr. President, the consideration of military action against Iraq comes at a time when U.S. forces are actively engaged throughout the world in a range of missions. Given the operational pressures these forces currently face, we must ask what the risks and trade-offs will be of defeating Iraq, particularly if Iraqi forces mass in Baghdad for urban operations. How many casualties must the American people be prepared to take in a worst-case scenario? What will the impact of sustained operations be on so-called high-demand, low-density assets? What military operations might we have to forego because of continued demands in Iraq? Will we still be prepared for the range of other threats that might emerge throughout the world? With little allied support and contributions, will we still be able to maintain military spending on transformational technologies and on sound quality of life for our forces if we are bearing a huge wartime cost alone? What will be the impact on the domestic economy of these resources drains and of the long-term costs of reconstructing Iraq? These questions must be answered before any military action commences so that the American people understand the risks and the sacrifices involved.

I ask these questions only to highlight the complexity of the undertaking and the need for Congress, the American people, and our friends around the world to understand exactly what is at stake and why we must act now. Only such a comprehensive strategic approach will ensure that we commit U.S. troops consciously and with full knowledge of the range of challenges we face-both in the initial campaign and in the long aftermath to follow. Even a strategy that has military action as its centerpiece will require great diplomatic efforts to ensure its success. I look forward to hearing the administration's answers and to working with you to find the best course of action.

Sincerely,


Ike Skelton
Ranking Democrat